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C.E.R.T.O.
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07 · CLOUD

Cloud

Connect a cloud account and seal shared content, keeping metadata and folder structure.

C.E.R.T.O. Desktop “Cloud Acquisition” screen: choose the provider — Google Drive, Dropbox or OneDrive — with authenticated OAuth access and saved sessions. The rate is flat, independent of the size and number of files.

C.E.R.T.O.'s Cloud module forensically acquires files from Google Drive, Dropbox and OneDrive. Cloud data lives on third-party servers and in the user's account, and can be modified or deleted remotely at any time: C.E.R.T.O. crystallises it as it was, with authenticated OAuth access, provider-side hash reconciliation (proof of provenance), sharing and revision analysis, and a double RFC 3161 timestamp. It is the tool for court-appointed and party experts, lawyers and law enforcement who must fix the contents of a cloud account before they change or vanish.

Key features

What this module does.

  • Connectors for Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive and iCloud.
  • OAuth token auto-refresh + optional capture of deleted items (trash).
  • Provider↔local hash reconciliation and forensic content analysis.
  • Hash and timestamp for each acquired item.
  • BagIt 1.0 bundle signed with Ed25519, double RFC 3161 timestamp and CASE/UCO.
Final forensic report: the interactive dashboard of the cloud bundle — summary, cloud tree, acquired files, forensic analysis, provider and OAuth account, hash inventory, API log, chain of custody and integrity check.
The rationale

Why acquire a cloud account.

Cloud files are not in your hands: they live on third-party servers and in someone else's account, who can modify, share or delete them remotely at any time. Acquiring them forensically means fixing them before they change or vanish.

Google Drive
Dropbox
OneDrive

Volatile data, controlled by others

A document, a photo or a shared folder can be removed or altered with a click, even after a dispute. The acquisition crystallises them in the state they are in, with a certified date.

Proof of provenance

Provider-side hash reconciliation compares the fingerprint declared by the cloud with the one recomputed on the downloaded file: it proves the acquired bytes are exactly those stored by the provider.

Exposure & sharing

Which files were shared with third parties or public via links: a decisive element to assess access, distribution and possible data exfiltration.

Revisions & trash

The provider-side version history (who changed what and when) and, where possible, the files in the trash: traces of activity and deleted-but-still-recoverable items.

Advanced analysis

Forensic analysis of acquired files.

Beyond downloading the files, C.E.R.T.O. automatically analyses their provenance, exposure, content and versioning, presenting the results in the report.

The report's “Forensic analysis” tab: provider-side hash reconciliation (Dropbox content-hash / Drive md5 / OneDrive quickXor), sharing and exposure, content categories, duplicate files, content anomalies, revision history and deleted items. Click to see it in full.

Provider hash reconciliation

Comparison between the cloud-declared hash and the local one: proof that the acquired bytes match the provider's.

Sharing & exposure

Files with public links or shared with third parties, to assess access, distribution and exfiltration risk.

Categories & duplicates

Classification by content type and groups of files with the same SHA-256 (same content in different paths).

Content anomalies

Comparison of real magic-bytes with the declared extension: disguised type, encrypted containers, double extension, executables.

Revision history

For files with multiple provider-side versions: each revision with date, author and size, to highlight edits and activity over time.

Deleted (trashed) items

The files in the provider trash at acquisition time: metadata and, where possible, content downloaded and hashed into the bundle.

Forensic pipeline

How the module operates.

A repeatable, documented procedure: from authenticated access to the cryptographic seal, every downloaded file leaves a verifiable trace inside the bundle.

01 · NTP

Synchronised time

Multi-source NTP sync with documented offset: the acquisition window is anchored.

02 · OAUTH

Authenticated access

Connection to the provider (Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive) via official OAuth: no password stored; provider, account and scopes are documented.

03 · TREE

Cloud map

Enumeration of the account structure (folders and files, with sizes and dates), to build the cloud tree and the selection.

04 · DOWNLOAD

File copy

API download of the selected files (or everything, optionally including the trash), preserving the folder structure.

05 · RECONCILE

Provider reconciliation

Comparison of the provider-declared hash with the locally recomputed one, and computation of MD5/SHA-1/SHA-256/SHA-512 for every file.

06 · ANALYZE

Forensic analysis

Automated analysis of sharing/exposure, categories, duplicates, content anomalies, revisions and deleted items.

07 · SEAL

Signature & double timestamp

manifest.json signed with Ed25519 + double RFC 3161 timestamp, packaging into a BagIt 1.0 bundle with a CASE/UCO description and verify.sh / verify.bat verifiers.

Bundle contents

Everything that gets generated.

Each acquisition produces a coordinated set of artefacts, each with a precise forensic role, organised into clearly-named folders inside data/.

Downloaded files

The copy of the files downloaded from the cloud, with the original folder structure (and, optionally, the trashed items): the authoritative media of the bundle.

evidence/files/ · evidence/deleted/

Cloud tree

The map of the account structure (folders, files, sizes, dates): a snapshot of how the cloud was organised at acquisition time.

reports/cloud-tree.txt

Forensic analysis

Provider hash reconciliation, sharing/exposure, categories and duplicates, content anomalies, revisions and deleted items.

reports/forensic-analysis.json

OAuth & API log

The access details (provider, account, OAuth scopes, moment of authentication) and the log of the API calls made during the acquisition.

network/oauth-connection.txt · api-log.txt

Hash inventory

The quadruple of hashes (MD5/SHA-1/SHA-256/SHA-512) of every file and the outcome of the reconciliation with the provider hash.

hashes/file-hashes.json

Forensic report

The report in PDF and TXT (operator, provider, account, file count, size, forensic statements) with its own RFC 3161 timestamp.

reports/report.pdf · report.tsr

Self-validation

A bundle that proves itself.

The bundle does not need C.E.R.T.O. to be validated: anyone, even years from now, can verify its authenticity with standard tools. The BagIt 1.0 structure and the interactive dashboard make it self-explanatory.

  • interactive.html — the navigable offline dashboard: summary, cloud tree, acquired files, forensic analysis, OAuth account, hash inventory, API log and client-side integrity check.
  • manifest.json signed with Ed25519 (RFC 8032), bound to the identity of the device registered at first launch.
  • Double RFC 3161 timestamp: inner anchor on data/tsa.tsr and outer seal on tagmanifest-sha256.txt.tsr. Free cascade Sectigo→DigiCert→GlobalSign; optional qualified eIDAS InfoCert.
  • manifest-sha256.txt and tagmanifest-sha256.txt (RFC 8493): fixity of the payload and of the control files; no file can be added or altered without the check failing.
  • metadata/evidence.case.jsonldCASE 1.3 / UCO 1.4 description of the evidence, and tsa-ca.pem for verifying the timestamp even offline.
  • verify.sh / verify.bat — standalone verifiers: they recompute the hashes, check the double timestamp and the signature, and declare “VALID BUNDLE”.
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Forensic cloud acquisition, supported providers, hash reconciliation, deleted files and bundle verification: the most common questions.

Why acquire the files of a cloud account?
Because data on Google Drive, Dropbox or OneDrive lives on third-party servers and in the user's account: it can be modified, shared or deleted remotely at any time. Forensic acquisition crystallises it as it was, with proof of provenance and a chain of custody, before it changes or vanishes.
Which cloud providers are supported?
Google Drive, Dropbox and OneDrive. Access is via the provider's official OAuth authentication: no password is stored, and the provider, account, OAuth scopes and the moment of authentication are documented in the bundle.
What is “provider-side hash reconciliation”?
It is the comparison between the hash declared by the provider (Dropbox content-hash, Google Drive md5, OneDrive quickXor) and the one recomputed locally on the downloaded file. A match proves the acquired bytes are identical to those actually stored by the provider: proof of provenance, not just integrity.
What forensic analysis does it perform on cloud files?
Beyond hash reconciliation: sharing and exposure analysis (files with public links or shared with third parties), content categories, duplicate files (same SHA-256 in different paths), content anomalies (disguised extension, encrypted containers, executables), revision history and, where possible, the files in the provider trash.
Can deleted files (trash) be acquired?
Yes, optionally: C.E.R.T.O. can include the items in the provider trash, acquiring their metadata and — where the API allows — their content, downloaded and hashed into the bundle. On Google Drive and Dropbox it is fully supported.
Is the acquisition valid as evidence in court?
The bundle follows recognised standards (ISO/IEC 27037, BagIt RFC 8493, RFC 3161, CASE/UCO) with an Ed25519 signature and a double timestamp; the authenticity and integrity of every file can be verified by anyone, even offline. The provider-side hash reconciliation strengthens the evidentiary value; the final assessment rests with the adjudicating authority.

Collect evidence with the Cloud module.

Register for free and download C.E.R.T.O. Desktop for Windows and macOS from your client area.